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# Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1988-1995

By

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[The following are extracts from an unclassified report of conventional arms transfers to developing nations (and developed nations as well) as published under the above title by the Library of Congress on 15 August 1996. The selections included herein begin with a discussion of major research findings regarding the dollar value of both arms transfer agreements and arms deliveries to the developing countries from 1988 through 1995. These findings are all cross-referenced to comparative data tables which are presented following the textual material. Special attention is given to the roles of the United States, the former Soviet Union, and China as arms suppliers, and to identification of the leading Third World arms recipient nations. The report concludes with a listing of the type and quantity of weapons delivered to developing nations by major arms suppliers in the 1988-1995 time period. Copies of the complete 86 page study (Report No. 96-677 F) are available from the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington DC 20540.]

## INTRODUCTION

The global conventional arms marketplace continues to go through a major adjustment in the post-Cold War, post-Persian Gulf war environment. Relationships between arms suppliers and recipients continue to evolve in reaction to changing political, military, and economic circumstances. During the period of this report, 1988-1995, conventional arms transfers to developing nations have comprised, on average, 69.4 percent of the value of all arms transfers made internationally. More recently, arms transfer *agreements* with developing nations have declined, but still constituted 63.4 percent of all such agreements globally from 1992-1995. In the period from 1992-1995, *deliveries* of conventional arms to developing nations represented 71.4 percent of the value of all worldwide arms deliveries. In 1995, arms deliveries to developing nations constituted over 76 percent of the value of all arms deliveries made worldwide. However, in 1995, arms transfer agreements, which represent orders for future delivery, comprised only 53.4 percent of the value of all such agreements globally.

These facts imply serious difficulties for arms exporters. The reductions in domestic defense spending in recent years by most major arms supplying countries have imposed significant pressures on defense industries to seek arms sales opportunities abroad to help compensate for falling domestic weapons orders. This has led arms sellers to attempt to gain arms purchase agreements with financially wealthy developing countries in regions such as the Near East and in Asia. As major industrial states seek to preserve their domestic defense industrial bases, they resist purchasing conventional weapons from other developed nations, unless they deem it essential to do so.

With options for arms exporters limited in a declining international marketplace, competition for available foreign deals has intensified greatly. Increasingly, defense industries have sought support from their governments in financing weapons sales to nations having an interest in purchasing weapons but with limited resources to do so. Such a program is currently

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under formulation in the United States in response to legislation establishing it. The U.S. Defense Export Loan Guarantee program, once in place, would permit eligible nations to secure financing support up to the program's overall limit of \$15 billion of outstanding guaranteed loans. All applicants for loans under this program, however, would have to put up an exposure fee from their own funds, in advance of receiving a loan in order to cover repayment risk.

While this arms export financing program may assist some prospective arms buyers in making purchases from the United States, it (and other programs comparable to it in other nations) illustrates the limitations that the costs of modern weapons place on prospects for their sale to many developing nations. The fact that many developing nations must obtain financing for their arms purchases places an inherent restriction on what they will be able to purchase. In these circumstances, there is a continuing likelihood that there will be a concentration of conventional arms sales to a limited number of wealthy developing countries. And, arms sales to these nations seem likely to be made at a lower level than was the case at the beginning of this decade. The significant difficulties faced by Saudi Arabia in servicing its weapons purchases, as well as its other obligations incurred during the Persian Gulf war, demonstrate that even wealthy developing nations have important limitations on their capacity to purchase.

Although American and foreign defense industries placed much attention on making major arms sales to Near East nations in the wake of the Persian Gulf war, governments of the United States and other nations attempted to manage levels of arms sales on a regional and international basis. In May 1991, President Bush initiated an effort, supported by many in Congress, to reach agreement among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to limit the size and character of their arms sales to the Near East region, as well as establish a procedure to notify each other before they made any arms sales to states in the Near East region.

This Bush initiative failed because the U.N. Permanent Five states could not agree on the best way to achieve the overall goal of reducing arms transfers to the Near East. China also accelerated the collapse of the effort when it withdrew from the talks following a major combat fighter aircraft sale by the United States to Taiwan. The end of the Bush initiative did not stop other efforts within Congress and the Executive branch to seek measures directed toward managing and, as possible, controlling conventional arms transfers, particularly to developing nations and "rogue" states such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea.

For example, Congress, in section 1601 of the Defense Department Authorization Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-160) directed the President to conduct a study of the "factors that contribute to the proliferation of strategic and advanced conventional military weapons and related equipment and technologies," as well as the policy options available to the United States to "inhibit such proliferation." A five-person Presidential Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy was established on January 20, 1995 by Executive Order to conduct the study envisioned by Congress.

As this review was being launched, the Clinton Administration released details of the President's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, embodied in Presidential Decision Directive 34 (PDD-34). As outlined in PDD-34, the Clinton Administration views conventional arms transfers to be a legitimate instrument of United States foreign policy when they enable the United States to help allies and friends deter aggression, promote regional stability, and increase interoperability of U.S. and allied military forces. Decisions to sell or not to sell U.S. weapons are to be made on an ad-hoc, case-by-case basis. The policy guidelines in PDD-34 are sufficiently broad so as to permit most sales on the grounds that they support the U.S. national interest.

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The Clinton Administration also characterized the establishment of a new post COCOM regime as the "centerpiece" of its efforts to promote "multilateral restraint" in the area of conventional arms sales and the transfer of sensitive military technologies. A regime was provisionally established to succeed COCOM on December 19, 1995, and termed the Wassenaar Arrangement. After Russia balked at complying with an arms export notification process central to the regime's operation at the first plenary meeting held in April 1996, the future of the new regime was called into question. However, in mid-July, Russia accepted the operational guidelines of the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the new post-COCOM entity was formally launched on July 12, 1996 with a membership of 33 nations.

Participating states are to control all items set forth by the Arrangement in a list of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and the Munitions Lists, with the objective of preventing unauthorized transfers or re-transfers of these items. November 1, 1996 was set as the target date for establishment of these lists. How effective Wassenaar will be as a multilateral arms control regime is very much an open question. It has no advance export review mechanism as did COCOM, and the decision to transfer or not transfer any item on the Arrangement's control lists is left solely to the discretion of each participating state. Further, the Wassenaar Arrangement expressly states that it is not directed against any state nor is it to interfere with the rights of states to acquire legitimate means for self-defense.

As this international effort at managing conventional arms transfers proceeds, the debate over policy criteria regarding such transfers continues in the United States. Although the Clinton Administration has stated that its decisions on arms transfers will not be determined by commercial concerns but primarily by the national interest, the President's arms transfer policy holds that supporting a strong, sustainable American defense industrial base is a key national security concern, and not a purely commercial issue. By doing so the Clinton arms transfer policy publicly elevates the significance of domestic economic considerations in the arms transfer decision-making process to a higher level than has formally been the case in previous administrations. It is noteworthy then, that in its final report issued in late June 1996, the President's Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy concluded that the United States' defense industrial base could not be sustained by aggressive arms sales overseas. Such a conclusion strongly suggests that the struggle to reconcile the economic interests of American arms exporting companies with the perspectives of conventional arms control advocates is likely to continue with intensity for the foreseeable future. [A reprint of the Advisory Board final report is included in this issue of *The DISAM Journal*.]

This report provides unclassified background data from U.S. government sources on transfers of conventional arms to developing nations by major suppliers for the period 1988 through 1995. It updates and revises the report entitled *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1987-1994*, published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) on August 4, 1995 (CRS Report 95-862F). The data in this new report completely supersede *all* data published in previous editions. Since these new data for 1988-1995 reflect potentially significant updates to and revisions in the underlying databases utilized for this report, only the data in this most recent edition should be used.

## MAJOR FINDINGS

### *General Trends In Arms Transfers Worldwide*

The value of all arms transfer *agreements* worldwide (to both developed and developing nations) in 1995 was \$28.8 billion. This is the lowest total of any year during the 1988-1995 period. This is the third consecutive year that total arms transfer agreements have declined from the previous year. The years overlapping the end of the Cold War and the period of post-Persian

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Gulf war rearmament were the most recent ones when the total value of arms transfer agreements worldwide exceeded \$40 billion (Table 8A).

In 1995, Russia was the leader in arms transfer agreements worldwide, making agreements valued at \$9.1 billion, or 31.6 percent of all such agreements. The United States ranked second with \$8.2 billion agreements or 28.6 percent of these agreements globally. Russian arms transfer agreements rose significantly from 1994 to 1995, from \$3.8 billion in 1994 to \$9.1 billion in 1995. United States arms agreements worldwide dropped notably from \$12.8 billion in 1994 to \$8.2 billion in 1995. This is the third year in a row that United States arms transfer agreements worldwide declined from the previous year. France's arms transfer agreements worldwide also fell significantly from \$8.9 billion in 1994 to \$2.7 billion in 1995. Russia, the United States, and France, the top three arms suppliers to the world in 1995 respectively—ranked by the value of their arms transfer agreements—collectively made agreements in 1995 valued at over \$20 billion, 69.5 percent of all arms transfer agreements made worldwide by all suppliers, (in constant 1995 dollars) (Table 8A).

The United States, while ranking second in worldwide arms transfer agreements in 1995, nonetheless ranked first among all arms suppliers to the world for the recent 1992-1995 time period, with \$69 billion in agreements, or 49.1 percent of the total (in constant 1995 dollars). The United States also ranked first in worldwide arms transfer agreements for the 1988-1991 period with \$65.9 billion in agreements or 30.5 percent. By contrast, Russia ranked second in arms transfer agreements worldwide in 1988-1991 with \$56.4 billion or 26.1 percent. But in the most recent period, 1992-1995, Russia ranked third with \$17.2 billion or 12.3 percent of all arms transfer agreements made globally (Tables 2A and 8A).

For the period 1992-1995, the total value of all arms transfer agreements with the world (\$140.5 billion) has been substantially less than the value of arms transfer agreements made by all suppliers worldwide during 1988-1991 (about \$216 billion), a decline of about 35 percent. As the worldwide arms transfer agreement totals have declined so have those to the developing world. During the period 1988-1991, developing world nations accounted for 75.3 percent of the value of all arms transfer agreements made worldwide. During 1992-1995 developing world nations accounted for 63.4 percent of all arms transfer agreements made globally. In 1995, developing nations accounted for 53.4 percent of all arms transfer agreements made worldwide (In constant 1995 dollars) (Table 8A).

In 1995, the United States ranked first in the value of arms *deliveries* made worldwide, making over \$12.5 billion in such deliveries. This is the fifth year in a row that the United States has led in global arms deliveries, reflecting, in particular, implementation of arms transfer agreements made during and in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war. The United Kingdom ranked second in worldwide arms deliveries in 1995, making \$4.9 billion in such deliveries. Russia ranked third in 1995, making \$3.1 billion in such deliveries. The top three suppliers of arms in 1995 collectively delivered over \$20.5 billion, 72.7 percent of all arms delivered worldwide by all suppliers in that year (Table 9A).

The value of all arms deliveries in 1995 was over \$28.2 billion. This is the first increase in the total value of arms deliveries from the previous year for the period from 1988-1995. This increase reflects the impact of implementation of some of the arms transfer agreements associated with the onset and aftermath of the Persian Gulf war (Table 2A).

The total value of all arms deliveries worldwide from 1992-1995 (nearly \$109 billion) was substantially less than the value of arms deliveries by all suppliers worldwide from 1988-1991 (\$201.8 billion), a decline of 46 percent. Developing world nations from 1992-1995 accounted for 71.4 percent of the value of all arms deliveries globally. In the earlier period, 1988-1991,

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developing world nations accounted for 78.4 percent of the value of all arms deliveries worldwide. Most recently, in 1995, developing nations collectively accounted for over 76.6 percent of the value of all arms deliveries globally (Table 2A).

### ***General Trends In Arms Transfers To Developing Nations***

The value of all arms transfer *agreements* with developing nations in 1995 was \$15.4 billion. This was the lowest yearly total, in real terms, for arms transfer agreements with developing nations for any of the years during the 1988-1995 period. The value of new arms transfer agreements with developing nations has declined for five consecutive years since 1990 when arms agreements rose during the Persian Gulf war (Table 1A).

By contrast in 1995, the value of all arms *deliveries* to developing nations (\$21.6 billion) was the first increase in deliveries values from the previous year during the 1988-1995 period. Deliveries values in 1995 (in real terms) were the highest for any year since 1991 and reflect the implementation of arms transfer agreements associated with the onset and aftermath of the Persian Gulf war (Table 2A).

In the most recent period, the United States has dominated the arms market in the developing world. From 1992-1995, the United States made \$40.6 billion in arms transfer agreements with developing nations, 45.3 percent of all such agreements. France, the second leading supplier during this period, made \$18.8 billion in arms transfer agreements or nearly 21 percent. In the earlier period before the Cold War had ended (1988-1991), the United States and Russia were much closer in agreement totals and percentage share. The United States ranked first with \$49.6 billion in arms transfer agreements with developing nations or 30.4 percent, while Russia made \$47.6 billion in agreements or 29.1 percent (in constant 1995 dollars) (Table 1A).

Since 1991, most arms transfers to developing nations have continued to be made by two to four major suppliers in a given year. The United States has been one of the top two suppliers each year, while France has been the most consistent competitor for the lead in arms transfer agreements, ranking first in 1994. As competition over a shrinking international arms market intensifies, it is likely that suppliers such as France, Russia, and the United Kingdom may routinely shift in their rankings relative to one another and to the United States. It may also prove to be the case that large new arms orders from developing nations will become less common during the rest of this decade, and that no single country will dominate in the total value of arms agreements from year to year as was the case in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Nations in the tier of suppliers below the United States, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom—such as China, other European, and non-European suppliers have been sporadic participants in the arms trade with developing nations. Most annual totals of arms transfer agreements for them during 1988-1995 reflect decreases, on average, about the turn of the decade. Few of these countries have the ability to be major suppliers of advanced weaponry on a sustained basis. They are much more likely to make sales of less sophisticated and less expensive military equipment (Tables 1A, 1F, 2A, and 2F).

Despite global changes since the Cold War's end, the developing world continues to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by conventional weapons suppliers. From 1992-1995, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations comprised, on average, 63.4 percent of all arms transfer agreements made worldwide. In 1995, the year when the lowest arms transfer agreements total since 1988 was recorded, the value of such agreements with developing nations still constituted 53.4 percent of the value of all such arms agreements concluded worldwide (Table 1A).

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## *United States*

In 1995, the total value, in real terms, of U.S. arms transfer agreements with developing nations decreased from the previous year's total, falling from \$6.3 billion in 1994 to \$3.8 billion in 1995. This is the lowest level, in real terms, of United States arms transfer agreements with developing nations during the last eight years, and the second consecutive year that the value of U.S. arms transfer agreements with such nations has been lower than the previous year. The U.S. share of the value of all such agreements was 24.6 percent in 1995, a decline from 28.8 percent in 1994 (in constant 1995 dollars) (Tables 1A and 1B).

The United States decline in arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 1995 reflects the absence of any large, high cost, arms transfer agreements during that year, comparable to those made during the years 1992-1995. Most of the key United States arms clients have apparently made their major weapons purchases for the foreseeable future, and are now in the process of absorbing the equipment they have already ordered. Saudi Arabia, the largest U.S. arms client in recent years has had significant budget difficulties due to declines in the price of oil and other debt obligations it undertook during the Persian Gulf war of 1990-1991, although the Saudi economy is now recovering. The Saudis have not placed any major weapons order with the U.S. since they ordered 72 F-15 fighters in 1993. For much of the remainder of this decade there are likely to be fewer major weapons orders for the United States from nations in the developing world comparable to those placed in the four years that witnessed the Cold War's end and a military rearmament period in the Near East following the Persian Gulf war.

## *Russia\**

The total value of Russia's arms agreements with developing nations rose notably from \$3.7 billion in 1994, to \$6 billion in 1995, placing it first in arms transfer agreements with the developing world. Russia's share of all developing world arms transfer agreements increased as well, rising from 16.7 percent in 1994, to 39 percent in 1995 (in constant 1995 dollars) (Tables 1A and 1B).

Russia's arms transfer agreements totals with developing nations declined every year from 1988 until 1994. Its arms agreements values ranged from a high of \$15.1 billion in 1988 to a low of \$1.3 billion in 1993 (in constant 1995 dollars). This progressive decline in arms sales reflected the effect of the economic and political problems of the former Soviet Union as the Cold War drew to a close. Many of Russia's traditional arms clients have been less wealthy developing nations that were once provided generous grant military assistance and deep discounts on arms purchases. The break up of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 dramatically ended that practice. Now Russia actively seeks to sell weapons as a means of obtaining hard currency. With Russia now having an emerging market economy, domestic defense industries also have greater freedom to promote the sale of their weaponry. Because it has a wide range of armaments to sell, from the most basic to the highly sophisticated, various developing countries view Russia as a potential source of their military equipment.

Russia's difficulties in selling its weapons have stemmed, in part, from the fact that most potential cash-paying arms purchasers have been long-standing customers of the United States or other major West European suppliers. These nations are not likely to replace their weapons inventories with non-Western armaments with which they are not familiar when newer versions

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\* *Russia* is used throughout the text, tables and charts, although data for *all* years prior to 1992 represent transactions of the former Soviet Union as a whole. Russia was by far the principal arms producer and exporter of all the former Soviet republics, and the political center for decision-making by the former Soviet Union. Data for 1992-1995 are for *Russia* exclusively.

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of existing equipment are readily available from traditional suppliers. Some of Russia's former arms clients in the developing world continue to express interest in obtaining additional weapons from it but are restricted by a lack of funds to pay for the armaments they might wish to obtain. Russia's difficult transition from the state supported and controlled industrial model of the former Soviet Union has also led some prospective arms customers to question whether Russian defense companies would be reliable suppliers of spare parts and support services needed to maintain weapons systems that they sell.

Nonetheless, Russia has made significant efforts to gain arms agreements with developing nations that can pay cash for their purchases. As the arms transfer agreement figures for 1994 and 1995 suggest, Russia has had some recent success in doing so. In the post-Cold War era, Russia's principal arms clients have been nations such as Iran and China. Russia has also made smaller arms deals with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates for armored fighting vehicles and with Malaysia for MiG-29 fighter aircraft. Iran, primarily due to its own economic problems, has fallen away as a major arms purchaser of Russia most recently, after having been a primary purchaser of Russian armaments at the turn of the decade, receiving such items as MiG-29 fighter aircraft, Su-24 fighter-bombers, T-72 tanks and Kilo class attack submarines.

Russia's recent and currently most important arms client is China. Beginning in 1994, Russia sold China 26 Su-27 fighter aircraft as well as Kilo class attack submarines. It is the continuation of orders for Su-27 fighters by China that constitutes the larger portion of Russia's arms transfer agreement total with developing nations in 1995 (Table 1A).

### *China*

China emerged as an important arms supplier to developing nations in the 1980s principally due to arms agreements made with both combatants in the Iran-Iraq war. In the period of this report, the value of China's arms transfer agreements with developing nations peaked in 1988 at \$3.1 billion. Since 1990, the value of China's arms transfer agreements with developing nations have generally been near \$500 million annually. In 1995, the value of China's arms transfer agreements with developing nations had fallen to an eight year low at \$200 million (in constant 1995 dollars) (Table 1A). However, China has become a major purchaser of arms, primarily from Russia. In 1995, China ranked first among developing nations in concluding new arms transfer agreements, making agreements valued at \$4.4 billion.

China does not appear likely to be a major supplier in the international arms market in the foreseeable future. It has few arms clients with financial resources seeking its military equipment, much of which is less advanced and sophisticated than weaponry available from Western suppliers and Russia. Where China could have a significant impact is in the sale of its missiles, which are attractive to some nations in the developing world, such as Iran and Syria. In the past China has demonstrated its readiness to sell such weapons to any state that sought them.

During the 1980s, China sold and delivered CSS-2 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) to Saudi Arabia, and Silkworm anti-shiping missiles to Iran. Other antiaircraft, anti-tank, and anti-ship missiles were sold by China to a variety of purchasers in developing countries. More recently, reports persist in various publications that China has sold M-11 surface-to-surface missiles to a long-standing arms client, Pakistan. Such reports and China's official statements on the subject call into question China's willingness to abide by the restrictions on missile transfers set out in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Having a need for hard currency and a product (missiles) that some developing nations would like to obtain, China may pose an important problem for those seeking to stem proliferation of advanced conventional weapons into volatile areas of the developing world.



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## *Major West European Countries*

The four major West European suppliers, as a group, (France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy) registered a significant decrease in their collective share of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations between 1994 and 1995. This group's share fell from 41.6 percent in 1994 to about 26 percent in 1995. The collective value of this group's arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 1995 was \$4 billion compared with a total of \$9.2 billion in 1994. Of these four suppliers, France was the principal supplier with \$2.4 billion in agreements. The value of the United Kingdom's agreements declined from \$714 million in 1994 to \$500 million in 1995. Italy registered an increase from over \$200 million in 1994 to \$800 million in 1995. In 1994, Germany's agreements with developing nations were effectively nil, but in 1995 were up to \$300 million (in constant 1995 dollars) (Tables 1A and 1B).

The major West European suppliers, as a group, averaged 25.7 percent of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations during the period from 1988-1995. Since the end of the Cold War, the major West European suppliers have generally maintained a notable share of arms transfer agreements. For the 1992-1995 period, they collectively averaged 30.3 percent of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations. Individual suppliers within the major West European group have had notable years for arms agreements, such as France in 1992, 1993, and 1994 (\$4.3 billion, \$3.9 billion and \$8.3 billion respectively); and the United Kingdom in 1988 (\$25.3 billion) (in constant 1995 dollars). Such totals have reflected the conclusion of a few large arms contracts with one or more major purchaser in a given year (tables 1A and 1B).

Strong government marketing support for foreign arms sales enhances the competitiveness of weapons produced by these major West European suppliers. Due to their ability to produce both advanced and basic air, ground, and naval weapons systems, the four major West European suppliers have proven quite capable of competing successfully with the United States and Russia for arms sales contracts with developing nations. Nevertheless, with a shrinking global marketplace for conventional weapons, individual West European suppliers may be hard pressed to secure large new arms contracts with developing nations as was the case in the past. As a result, some of these suppliers may choose not to compete for sales of some weapons categories, reducing or eliminating some weapons categories actually produced. In an effort to maintain elements of their defense industrial base they may seek joint production ventures with other weapons suppliers.

## *Regional Arms Transfer Agreement Values*

The Persian Gulf war from August 1990-February 1991 played a major role in stimulating high levels of arms transfer agreements with nations in that region. The war created new demands by key nations in the Near East such as Saudi Arabia and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), for a variety of advanced weapons systems. These demands were not only a response to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, but an effort to address concerns regarding potential threats from a hostile Iran. Efforts aimed at modernizing and upgrading defense forces in several countries in Asia [also] have led to important new conventional weapons sales in that region. Data on regional arms transfer agreements from 1988-1995 reflect the continued primacy of these two regions of the developing world as international arms markets:

### **Near East**

- The Near East continues to be the largest developing world arms market. In 1988-1991 it accounted for 57 percent of the total value of all developing nations arms transfer

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agreements (\$78.5 billion in current dollars). During 1992-1995, the region accounted for 53.5 percent of all such agreements (\$46.3 billion in current dollars).

- The United States has dominated arms transfer agreements with the Near East during the 1992-1995 time period with 56.4 percent of their total value. France was second during 1992-1995 with 26.6 percent. In 1988-1991, the United States accounted for 40.3 percent of arms agreements with this region, while the United Kingdom held 26.6 percent.

## Asia

- Asia is the second largest and fastest growing developing world arms market. In the earlier period (1988-1991), Asia accounted for 30.9 percent of the total value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations (\$42.5 billion in current dollars). During 1992-1995, the region accounted for 39.2 percent of all such agreements (nearly \$34 billion in current dollars).
- In the earlier period (1988-1991), Russia ranked first in arms transfer agreements with Asia with 54.8 percent. During these years, this region included some of Russia's traditionally largest arms clients such as India, Afghanistan, and Vietnam, during these years. The United States ranked second with 23.6 percent. The major West European suppliers, as a group, made 12.2 percent of this region's agreements in 1988-1991. In the later period (1992-1995), the United States ranked first in Asian agreements with 34.3 percent on the strength of major aircraft sales to Taiwan and Malaysia. Russia ranked second with 26.2 percent aided by aircraft sales to China and Malaysia. France ranked third with 16.2 percent, primarily due to a major aircraft sale to Taiwan. The major West European suppliers, as a group, made 26.8 percent of this region's agreements in 1992-1995.

## Leading Developing Nations Arms Purchasers

Saudi Arabia has been, by a wide margin, the leading developing world arms purchaser from 1988-1995, making arms transfer agreements totaling \$67.1 billion during these years (in *current* dollars). In both the 1988-1991 and 1992-1995 periods, the value of its arms transfer agreements was very high (\$44.8 billion in 1988-1991 and \$22.3 billion in 1992-1995). The total value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations from 1988-1995 was \$225.6 billion (in *current* dollars). Thus, Saudi Arabia alone was responsible for nearly 30 percent of all developing world arms transfer agreements during these eight years. In the most recent period—1992-1995—Saudi Arabia alone accounted for 25.8 percent of all developing world arms transfer agreements (\$22.3 billion out of \$86.3 billion). China ranked first among all developing world recipients in the value of arms transfer agreements in 1995, concluding \$4.4 billion in such agreements, while Saudi Arabia ranked second with \$2.1 billion in arms agreements (in *current* dollars) (Tables 1 and 1I).

Six of the ten leading developing nations arms recipients during the 1988-1995 period registered declines in the value of their arms transfer *agreements* from the 1988-1991 period to the 1992-1995 period. Decreases by Cuba and Afghanistan reflect the diminished financial support for these countries by Russia in the post-Cold War era. Declines in agreements values of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel, reflect their reductions in weapons purchases in the post Persian Gulf war period. Increases in agreement values by China and Taiwan reflect major combat aircraft purchases by both since 1992 (Table 1I).

Despite some large decreases in the values of the arms transfer *agreements* of specific nations from 1988-1991 to 1992-1995, the top ten developing world recipient nations in both time periods still accounted for the major portion of the total developing nations arms market.

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During 1988-1991 the top ten collectively accounted for 70.9 percent of *all* developing world arms transfer agreements. During 1992-1995 the top ten collectively accounted for nearly 75 percent of all such agreements. Arms transfer *agreements* with the top ten developing world recipients, as a group, totaled \$12.3 billion in 1995 or 79.9 percent of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in that year. This reflects a continuing concentration of total developing world arms purchases by relatively few countries (Tables 1 and 1I).

China ranked first among all developing world recipients in the value of arms transfer *agreements* in 1995, concluding \$4.4 billion in such agreements. Saudi Arabia, ranked second in agreements in 1995 at \$2.1 billion, and India ranked third with \$1 billion in agreements.

Saudi Arabia was by far the leading recipient of arms *deliveries* among developing world recipients in 1995, receiving \$8.3 billion in such deliveries. Saudi Arabia alone received 38.4 percent of the total value of all arms deliveries to developing nations in 1995.

Arms deliveries to the top ten developing nation recipients, as a group, constituted \$16.7 billion, or 77.3 percent of all arms deliveries to developing nations in 1995. Six of the top ten recipients were in the Asian region.

### ***Weapon Types Recently Delivered To Near East Nations***

Regional *weapons delivery* data reflect the diverse sources of supply of conventional weaponry available to developing nations. Even though Russia, the United States, and the four major West European suppliers dominate in the delivery of the fourteen classes of weapons examined, it is also evident that the other European suppliers, and non-European suppliers, including China, are capable of being leading suppliers of selected types of conventional armaments to developing nations.

Weapons deliveries to the **Near East**, the largest purchasing region in the developing world, reflect the substantial quantities and types delivered by both major and lesser suppliers. The following is an illustrative summary of weapons deliveries to this region for the period **1992-1995**.

#### **United States:**

- 1,571 tanks and self-propelled guns
- 191 artillery pieces
- 2,040 APCs and armored cars
- 239 supersonic combat aircraft
- 105 helicopters
- 1,137 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
- 296 anti-shiping missiles

#### **Russia:**

- 290 tanks and self-propelled guns
- 680 APCs and armored cars
- 2 submarines
- 50 helicopters
- 20 anti-shiping missiles

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**China:**

- 10 guided missile boats
- 30 supersonic combat aircraft
- 70 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
- 50 anti-shipping missiles

**Major West European suppliers:**

- 4,030 artillery pieces
- 33 minor surface combatants
- 1,050 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
- 40 anti-shipping missiles

**All other European suppliers:**

- 260 tanks and self-propelled guns
- 650 artillery pieces
- 610 APCs and armored cars

**All other suppliers:**

- 140 tanks and self propelled guns
- 20 supersonic combat aircraft
- 90 surface-to-surface missiles

Large quantities of major combat systems were delivered to the Near East region from 1992-1995, in particular, tanks and self-propelled guns, armored vehicles, artillery pieces, supersonic combat aircraft, and air defense missiles. While a number of the deliveries totals to the Near East in certain categories during 1992-1995 are lower than those made during the 1988-1991 period, they still represent significant levels of arms transfers. The United States and China made significant deliveries of supersonic combat aircraft to the region. Russia, the United States, and all European suppliers collectively, other than the four major West Europeans, were the principal suppliers of tanks and self-propelled guns. These two weapons categories—supersonic combat aircraft and tanks and self-propelled guns—are especially costly and are an important part of the dollar values of arms deliveries of Russia and the United States to the Near East region during the 1992-1995 period. The cost of naval combatants is also significant, and the delivery of two submarines by Russia and thirty-three minor surface combatants by the major West European suppliers during this period also contributed notably to the total value of their respective deliveries to the Near East for these years.

It should be noted that some of the less expensive weapons systems delivered to the Near East are deadly and can create significant security threats within the region. In particular, from 1992-1995, the United States delivered 296 anti-shipping missiles, China delivered 50, Russia delivered 20, and the major West Europeans, collectively, delivered 40. All other non-European suppliers collectively delivered 90 surface-to-surface missiles. China also delivered 10 guided missile boats.

These data further indicate that a number of suppliers, other than the dominant ones, delivered large quantities of weapons such as artillery pieces and armored vehicles to the Near East from 1992-1995. European suppliers—excluding the four major West Europeans—delivered 650 artillery pieces and 610 APCs and armored cars, as well as 260 tanks and self-

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propelled guns. All other non-European suppliers collectively delivered 140 tanks and self-propelled guns and 20 supersonic combat aircraft.

### *Special Notes*

1. **Calendar Year Data Used.** All arms transfer and arms delivery data in this report are for the *calendar year* or *calendar year period* given. This applies to both U.S. and foreign data alike. United States government departments and agencies, such as the Defense Department (DoD) and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), routinely publish data on U.S. arms transfers and deliveries but use the United States *fiscal* year as the computational time period for these data. (A U.S. *fiscal* year covers the period from October 1 until September 30). As a consequence, there are likely to be distinct differences noted in those published totals and those provided in this report which uses a calendar year basis for its figures. Details regarding data included are outlined in footnotes at the bottom of table 1.

2. **Constant 1995 Dollars.** Throughout this report values of arms transfer agreements and values of arms deliveries for all suppliers are expressed in U.S. dollars. Values for any given year generally reflect the exchange rates that prevailed during that specific year. In many instances, the report converts these dollar amounts (current dollars) into constant 1995 dollars. Although this helps to eliminate the distorting effects of inflation to permit a more accurate comparison of various dollar levels over time, the effects of fluctuating exchange rates are not necessarily neutralized. The deflators used for the constant dollar calculations in this report are those provided by the Department of Defense and are set out at the bottom of Tables 1 and 2. **Unless otherwise noted in the report, all dollar values are stated in constant terms.** Because all regional data tables are composed of four-year aggregate dollar totals (1988-1991 and 1992-1995), they must be expressed in current dollar terms. Where tables rank leading arms suppliers to developing nations or leading developing nation recipients using four-year aggregate dollar totals, these values are expressed in current dollars.

3. **Definition Of The Developing Nations And Regions.** The developing nations category, as used in this report, includes all countries *except* the United States, Russia, European nations, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. A listing of countries located in the regions defined for purpose of this analysis—Asia, Near East, Latin America, and Africa—is provided at the end of the report.

4. **United States Commercial Arms Exports Excluded.** U.S. *commercial* sales and deliveries data are *excluded*. This is done because the data maintained on U.S. commercial sales agreements and deliveries are incomplete and are significantly less precise than those for the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, which accounts for the overwhelming portion of U.S. conventional arms transfer agreements and deliveries. There are no official compilations of *commercial agreement* data comparable to that for the FMS program maintained on an annual basis. Annual *commercial deliveries* data are obtained from shipper's export documents and completed licenses returned from ports of exit by the U.S. Customs Service to the Office of Defense Trade Controls (PM/DTC) of the State Department, which makes the final compilation. This approach to obtaining commercial deliveries data is less systematic than that taken by the Department of Defense for government-to-government transactions.

The annual *rank* of the United States in the period from 1988-1995 has possibly been affected once—in 1991—by exclusion of the existing data on U.S. commercial arms *deliveries* to developing nations (see table 2). Since the total values of all U.S. deliveries are understated somewhat by exclusion of commercial arms deliveries figures, those commercial data are provided here to complete this portion of the available record. It should be noted that the U. S. is the only major arms supplier that has two distinct systems for the export of weapons, the

government-to-government (FMS) system and the licensed commercial export system. The values of U.S. commercial arms deliveries to developing nations for *fiscal* years 1988-1995, according to the State Department, were as follows:

FY 1988	\$1,990,899
FY 1989	\$2,599,204
FY 1990	\$1,749,002
FY 1991	\$1,644,152
FY 1992	\$627,314
FY 1993	\$545,646
FY 1994	\$289,111
FY 1995	\$1,212,954

*(In thousands of current U.S. dollars)*

TABLE 1									
ARMS TRANSFER AGREEMENTS WITH DEVELOPING NATIONS, BY SUPPLIER, 1988-1995*									
(In millions of current U.S. dollars)									
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	TOTAL 1988-1995
United States	8,478	7,159	13,911	13,459	13,823	14,952	6,218	3,789	81,789
Russia**	12,300	11,700	10,700	5,800	1,400	1,200	3,600	6,000	52,700
France	900	1,100	2,500	2,900	4,000	3,700	8,100	2,400	25,600
United Kingdom	20,600	800	1,400	300	1,800	2,100	700	500	28,200
China	2,500	1,400	2,200	500	500	500	800	200	8,600
Germany	200	400	400	1,500	200	600	0	300	3,600
Italy	200	300	300	100	500	300	200	800	2,700
All Other European	1,900	2,600	1,300	1,200	1,000	300	1,100	700	10,100
All Others	2,400	2,400	1,600	1,900	1,100	1,300	900	700	12,300
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>49,478</b>	<b>27,859</b>	<b>34,311</b>	<b>27,659</b>	<b>24,323</b>	<b>24,952</b>	<b>21,618</b>	<b>15,389</b>	<b>225,589</b>
Dollar inflation index (1995=1.00)***	0.8143	0.8464	0.8713	0.9124	0.9296	0.9575	0.9805	1.0000	
All foreign data are rounded to the nearest \$100 million.									
* Developing nations category excludes the U.S., former U.S.S.R., Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. All data are for the calendar year given except for U.S. MAP (Military Assistance Program) and IMET (International Military Education and Training) data which are included for the particular fiscal year. All amounts given include the values of weapons, spare parts, construction, all associated services, military assistance, and training programs. Statistics for foreign countries are based upon estimated selling prices. U.S. commercial sales contract values are excluded.									
** Prior to 1992 reflects data for the former Soviet Union.									
*** Based on Department of Defense Price Deflator.									
Source: U.S. Government									

TABLE 1A

**ARMS TRANSFER AGREEMENTS WITH DEVELOPING NATIONS,  
BY SUPPLIER, 1988-1995**  
(In millions of constant 1995 U.S. dollars)

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	TOTAL 1988-1995
United States	10,411	8,458	15,966	14,751	14,870	15,616	6,342	3,789	90,203
Russia	15,105	13,823	12,281	6,357	1,506	1,253	3,672	6,000	59,996
France	1,105	1,300	2,869	3,178	4,303	3,864	8,261	2,400	27,281
United Kingdom	25,298	945	1,607	329	1,936	2,193	714	500	33,522
China	3,070	1,654	2,525	548	538	522	816	200	9,873
Germany	246	473	459	1,644	215	627	0	300	3,963
Italy	246	354	344	110	538	313	204	800	2,909
All Other European	2,333	3,072	1,492	1,315	1,076	313	1,122	700	11,423
All Others	2,947	2,836	1,836	2,082	1,183	1,358	918	700	13,861
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>60,761</b>	<b>32,915</b>	<b>39,379</b>	<b>30,315</b>	<b>26,165</b>	<b>26,060</b>	<b>22,048</b>	<b>15,389</b>	<b>253,031</b>

TABLE 1B

**ARMS TRANSFER AGREEMENTS WITH DEVELOPING NATIONS,  
BY SUPPLIER, 1988-1995**  
(Expressed as a percent of total, by year)

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
United States	17.13%	25.70%	40.54%	48.66%	56.83%	59.92%	28.76%	24.62%
Russia	24.86%	42.00%	31.19%	20.97%	5.76%	4.81%	16.65%	38.99%
France	1.82%	3.95%	7.29%	10.48%	16.45%	14.83%	37.47%	15.60%
United Kingdom	41.63%	2.87%	4.08%	1.08%	7.40%	8.42%	3.24%	3.25%
China	5.05%	5.03%	6.41%	1.81%	2.06%	2.00%	3.70%	1.30%
Germany	0.40%	1.44%	1.17%	5.42%	0.82%	2.40%	0.00%	1.95%
Italy	0.40%	1.08%	0.87%	0.36%	2.06%	1.20%	0.93%	5.20%
All Other European	3.84%	9.33%	3.79%	4.34%	4.11%	1.20%	5.09%	4.55%
All Others	4.85%	8.61%	4.66%	6.87%	4.52%	5.21%	4.16%	4.55%
<i>[Major West European*</i>	<i>44.26%</i>	<i>9.33%</i>	<i>13.41%</i>	<i>17.35%</i>	<i>26.72%</i>	<i>26.85%</i>	<i>41.64%</i>	<i>25.99%]</i>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\* Major West European category includes France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy.

**TABLE 1F**  
**ARMS TRANSFER AGREEMENTS WITH DEVELOPING NATIONS, 1988-1995:**  
**LEADING SUPPLIERS COMPARED**  
(In millions of current U.S. dollars)

Rank	Supplier	Agreements Value 1988-1991
1	U.S.	43,007
2	U.S.S.R./Russia	40,500
3	U.K.	23,100
4	France	7,400
5	China	6,600
6	Germany (FRG)	2,500
7	North Korea	1,800
8	Canada	1,100
9	Spain	1,000
10	South Korea	900
11	Italy	900

Rank	Supplier	Agreements Value 1992-1995
1	U.S.	38,782
2	France	18,200
3	Russia	12,200
4	U.K.	5,100
5	China	2,000
6	Italy	1,800
7	Germany	1,100
8	Spain	800
9	Israel	800
10	North Korea	500
11	Netherlands	400

Rank	Supplier	Agreements Value 1988-1995
1	U.S.	81,789
2	Russia	52,700
3	U.K.	28,200
4	France	25,600
5	China	8,600
6	Germany	3,600
7	Italy	2,700
8	North Korea	2,300
9	Spain	1,800
10	Czechoslovakia (unified)	1,500
11	Israel	1,500

\* All foreign data are rounded to the nearest \$100 million. Where foreign data totals are the same, the actual rank order is maintained.

Source: U.S. Government



**TABLE II**  
**ARMS TRANSFERS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS, 1988-1995:**  
**AGREEMENTS BY THE LEADING RECIPIENTS**  
(In millions of current U.S. dollars)\*

Rank	Recipient	Agreements Value 1988-1991
1	Saudi Arabia	44,800
2	Afghanistan	11,500
3	Iran	8,900
4	Egypt	7,000
5	South Korea	4,800
6	Cuba	4,700
7	Taiwan	4,600
8	India	4,600
9	Vietnam	4,000
10	Pakistan	3,800

Rank	Recipient	Agreements Value 1992-1995
1	Saudi Arabia	22,300
2	Taiwan	10,800
3	China	6,400
4	Kuwait	6,100
5	U.A.E.	4,800
6	Egypt	3,200
7	Israel	3,200
8	Malaysia	3,200
9	South Korea	2,400
10	Pakistan	2,300

Rank	Recipient	Agreements Value 1988-1995
1	Saudi Arabia	67,100
2	Taiwan	15,400
3	Afghanistan	11,500
4	Egypt	10,200
5	Iran	10,000
6	Kuwait	9,500
7	China	6,900
8	Israel	6,600
9	U.A.E.	6,200
10	Cuba	4,900

\* All foreign data are rounded to the nearest \$100 million. Where foreign data totals are the same, the actual rank order is maintained.

Source: U.S. Government

TABLE 2A

**ARMS DELIVERIES TO DEVELOPING NATIONS, BY SUPPLIER, 1988-1995**  
(In millions of constant 1995 dollars)

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1988-95
United States	5,546	4,228	6,059	6,439	8,578	7,680	6,212	9,537	54,280
Russia	24,070	23,157	19,052	6,576	2,689	1,984	1,326	2,400	81,254
France	1,351	1,772	5,279	1,754	861	627	1,020	1,600	14,263
United Kingdom	4,544	4,371	4,361	4,274	4,303	3,969	4,793	4,500	35,116
China	3,684	3,190	2,295	1,534	1,076	1,149	714	600	14,242
Germany	860	354	344	1,315	215	627	816	800	5,331
Italy	368	236	115	110	108	0	102	0	1,039
All Other European	5,403	2,836	1,951	877	1,721	836	816	600	15,039
All Others	4,298	2,836	1,492	1,206	1,183	1,358	1,530	1,600	15,502
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>50,124</b>	<b>42,981</b>	<b>40,949</b>	<b>24,085</b>	<b>20,734</b>	<b>18,229</b>	<b>17,329</b>	<b>21,637</b>	<b>236,067</b>

TABLE 2B

**ARMS DELIVERIES TO DEVELOPING NATIONS, BY SUPPLIER, 1988-1995**  
(Expressed as a percent of total, by year)

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
United States	11.06%	10.60%	16.61%	26.73%	41.37%	42.13%	35.85%	44.08%
Russia	48.02%	49.14%	39.96%	27.30%	12.97%	10.89%	7.65%	11.09%
France	2.70%	4.44%	14.47%	7.28%	4.15%	3.44%	5.89%	7.39%
United Kingdom	9.07%	12.14%	11.96%	17.75%	20.75%	21.77%	27.66%	20.80%
China	7.35%	7.99%	6.29%	6.37%	5.19%	6.30%	4.12%	2.77%
Germany	1.72%	0.89%	0.94%	5.46%	1.04%	3.44%	4.71%	3.70%
Italy	0.74%	0.59%	0.31%	0.46%	0.52%	0.00%	0.59%	0.00%
All Other European	10.78%	7.11%	5.35%	3.64%	8.30%	4.58%	4.71%	2.77%
All Others	8.58%	7.11%	4.09%	5.01%	5.71%	7.45%	8.83%	7.39%
[Major West European *	14.21%	18.06%	27.69%	30.94%	26.46%	28.65%	38.84%	31.89%]
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\* (Major West European category includes France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy.)

**TABLE 2F**  
**ARMS DELIVERIES TO DEVELOPING NATIONS, 1988-1995:**  
**LEADING SUPPLIERS COMPARED**  
(In millions of current U.S. dollars)\*

Rank	Supplier	Deliveries Value 1988-1991
1	U.S.S.R./Russia	59,900
2	U.S.	19,249
3	U.K.	15,500
4	China	9,100
5	France	8,800
6	Germany (FRG)	2,500
7	Israel	2,100
8	North Korea	1,500
9	Poland	1,300
10	Czechoslovakia	1,200
11	Spain	1,100

Rank	Supplier	Deliveries Value 1992-1995
1	U.S.	30,956
2	U.K.	17,000
3	Russia	8,100
4	France	4,000
5	China	3,400
6	Germany	2,400
7	Israel	2,000
8	Canada	1,000
9	Spain	600
10	Belgium	500
11	South Africa	500

Rank	Supplier	Deliveries Value 1988-1995
1	Russia/U.S.S.R.	63,000
2	U.S.	50,205
3	U.K.	32,500
4	France	12,800
5	China	12,500
6	Germany	4,900
7	Israel	4,100
8	North Korea	2,000
9	Czechoslovakia (unified)	1,900
10	Spain	1,700
11	Poland	1,400

\* All foreign data are rounded to the nearest \$100 million. Where foreign data totals are the same, the actual rank order is maintained.

Source: U.S. Government

**TABLE 3**  
**Number of Weapons Delivered by Major Suppliers to Developing Nations\***

<u>Weapons Category</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Russia</u>	<u>China</u>	<u>Major West European**</u>	<u>All Other European</u>	<u>All Others</u>
<b>1988-1991</b>						
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns	615	3710	330	120	470	560
Artillery	316	3330	2090	3800	850	1000
APCs and Armored Cars	777	5490	390	340	980	490
Major Surface Combatants	0	8	3	7	4	6
Minor Surface Combatants	7	47	33	73	43	135
Guided Missile Boats	0	0	4	3	0	2
Submarines	0	8	0	3	1	1
Supersonic Combat Aircraft	272	380	180	110	10	290
Subsonic Combat Aircraft	82	80	0	70	0	20
Other Aircraft	135	190	70	90	240	190
Helicopters	121	470	0	320	80	50
Surface-to-Air Missiles	2092	6560	440	1120	450	1500
Surface-to-Surface Missiles	0	1780	240	0	0	290
Anti-Shipping Missiles	61	480	170	200	0	10
<b>1992-1995</b>						
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns	1625	540	310	320	260	390
Artillery	261	530	1170	4150	670	330
APCs and Armored Cars	2091	1400	40	400	1000	490
Major Surface Combatants	0	0	5	43	0	0
Minor Surface Combatants	4	11	12	47	26	42
Guided Missile Boats	0	0	14	0	0	2
Submarines	0	5	0	7	0	0
Supersonic Combat Aircraft	265	70	110	0	30	90
Subsonic Combat Aircraft	53	0	0	80	0	0
Other Aircraft	42	30	60	70	100	220
Helicopters	203	180	0	130	40	50
Surface-to-Air Missiles	1443	840	330	3180	640	720
Surface-to-Surface Missiles	0	0	0	0	0	90
Anti-Shipping Missiles	371	20	90	50	0	0

\* Developing nations category excludes the U.S., Russia, former U.S.S.R., Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. All data are for calendar years given.

\*\* Major West European includes France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy totals as an aggregate figure.

NOTE: Data relating to surface-to-surface and anti-shipping missiles by foreign suppliers are estimates based on a variety of sources having a wide range of accuracy. As such, individual data entries in these two weapons delivery categories are not necessarily definitive.

Source: U.S. Government

TABLE 8A

**ARMS TRANSFER AGREEMENTS WITH THE WORLD BY SUPPLIER, 1988-1995**  
(In millions of constant 1995 U.S. dollars)

	TOTAL								
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1988-95
United States	13,776	11,583	20,766	19,790	24,274	23,745	12,758	8,231	134,923
Russia	18,175	18,313	13,313	6,576	1,936	2,402	3,774	9,100	73,589
France	2,456	1,772	3,328	3,617	4,733	5,013	8,873	2,700	32,492
United Kingdom	26,526	2,127	2,525	1,206	2,474	3,238	1,224	1,000	40,320
China	3,070	1,654	2,525	548	538	627	816	200	9,978
Germany	1,474	6,971	2,295	1,863	1,614	1,044	1,326	2,000	18,587
Italy	368	709	574	438	645	418	204	1,000	4,356
All Other European	4,912	5,080	2,066	2,192	1,829	731	1,938	1,200	19,948
All Others	4,298	3,781	2,984	2,302	2,044	1,984	1,428	3,400	22,221
TOTAL	75,055	51,990	50,376	38,532	40,087	39,202	32,341	28,831	356,414

TABLE 9A

**ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE WORLD, BY SUPPLIER, 1988-1995**  
(in millions of constant 1995 U.S. dollars))

	TOTAL								
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1988-1995
United States	10,561	8,717	10,256	10,259	11,524	11,159	10,038	12,549	85,063
Russia	27,017	22,330	17,216	6,795	2,689	3,238	1,530	3,100	83,915
France	2,456	2,836	5,968	2,411	1,936	1,149	1,428	2,200	20,384
United Kingdom	6,017	5,789	5,279	5,151	5,056	4,804	5,303	4,900	42,299
China	3,684	3,190	2,295	1,534	1,076	1,253	714	600	14,346
Germany	2,210	1,536	1,836	2,630	1,183	1,775	1,428	1,200	13,798
Italy	614	236	230	329	430	418	102	0	2,359
All Other European	8,351	4,726	3,328	1,973	3,227	1,567	1,326	1,000	25,498
All Others	5,649	4,017	2,295	2,082	1,829	2,089	2,448	2,700	23,109
TOTAL	66,559	53,377	48,703	33,164	28,950	27,452	24,317	28,249	310,771

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## DESCRIPTION OF ITEMS COUNTED IN WEAPONS CATEGORIES, 1988-1995

**TANKS AND SELF-PROPELLED GUNS:** This category includes light, medium, and heavy tanks; self-propelled artillery; self-propelled assault guns.

**ARTILLERY:** This category includes field and air defense artillery, mortars, rocket launchers and recoilless rifles—100 mm and over; FROG launchers—100 mm and over.

**ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APCS) AND ARMORED CARS:** This category includes personnel carriers, armored and amphibious; armored infantry fighting vehicles, armored reconnaissance and command vehicles.

**MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS:** This category includes aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates.

**MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS:** This category includes minesweepers, subchasers, motor torpedo boats, patrol craft, motor gunboats.

**SUBMARINES:** This category includes all submarines, including midget submarines.

**GUIDED MISSILE PATROL BOATS:** This category includes all boats in this class.

**SUPERSONIC COMBAT AIRCRAFT:** This category includes all fighters and bombers designed to function operationally at speeds above Mach 1.

**SUBSONIC COMBAT AIRCRAFT:** This category includes all fighters and bombers, including propeller driven, designed to function operationally at speeds below Mach 1.

**OTHER AIRCRAFT:** This category includes all other fixed-wing aircraft, including trainers, transports, reconnaissance aircraft, and communications/utility aircraft.

**HELICOPTERS:** This category includes all helicopters, including combat and transport.

**SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES (SAMs):** This category includes all air defense missiles.

**SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES:** This category includes all surface-to-surface missiles without regard to range, such as SCUDs and CSS-2s. It excludes all anti-tank missiles and all anti-shiping missiles.

**ANTI-SHIPING MISSILES:** This category includes all missiles in this class such as the Harpoon, Silkworm, Styx, and Exocet.

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## REGIONS IDENTIFIED IN ARMS TRANSFER TABLES AND CHARTS

ASIA	NEAR EAST	EUROPE
Afghanistan	Algeria	Albania
Australia	Bahrain	Armenia
Bangladesh	Egypt	Austria
Brunei	Iran	Azerbaijan
Burma (Myanmar)	Iraq	Belarus
China	Israel	Bulgaria
Fiji	Jordan	Belgium
French Polynesia	Kuwait	Canada
Gilbert Islands	Lebanon	Czech Republic
Hong Kong	Libya	Cyprus
India	Morocco	Denmark
Indonesia	Oman	Estonia
Japan	Qatar	Finland
Kampuchea (Cambodia)	Saudi Arabia	France
Kazakhstan	Syria	Georgia
Kyrgyzstan	Tunisia	Germany
Laos	United Arab Emirates	Greece
Macao	Yemen	Hungary
Malaysia		Iceland
Mongolia		Ireland
Nauru		Italy
Nepal		Latvia
New Caledonia		Liechtenstein
New Hebrides		Lithuania
New Zealand		Luxembourg
Norfolk Islands		Malta
North Korea		Moldova
Pakistan		Netherlands
Papua New Guinea		Norway
Philippines		Poland
Pitcairn		Portugal
Singapore		Romania
Solomon Islands		Russia
South Korea		Slovak Republic
Sri Lanka		Spain
Taiwan		Sweden
Tajikistan		Switzerland
Thailand		Turkey
Turkmenistan		Ukraine
Uzbekistan		United Kingdom
Vietnam		Yugoslavia/(former)
Western Samoa		

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## REGIONS IDENTIFIED IN ARMS TRANSFER TABLES AND CHARTS

### AFRICA

Angola  
Benin  
Botswana  
Burkina Faso  
Burundi  
Cameroon  
Cape Verde  
Central African Republic  
Chad  
Congo  
Côte d'Ivoire  
Djibouti  
Equatorial Guinea  
Ethiopia  
Gabon  
Gambia  
Ghana  
Guinea  
Guinea-Bissau  
Kenya  
Lesotho  
Liberia  
Madagascar  
Malawi  
Mali  
Mauritania  
Mauritius  
Mozambique  
Namibia  
Niger  
Nigeria  
Réunion  
Rwanda  
Senegal  
Seychelles  
Sierra Leone  
Somalia  
South Africa  
Sudan  
Swaziland  
Tanzania

Togo  
Uganda  
Zaire  
Zambia  
Zimbabwe

### LATIN AMERICA

Antigua  
Argentina  
Bahamas  
Barbados  
Belize  
Bermuda  
Bolivia  
Brazil  
British Virgin Islands  
Cayman Islands  
Chile  
Colombia  
Costa Rica  
Cuba  
Dominica  
Dominican Republic  
Ecuador  
El Salvador  
French Guiana  
Grenada  
Guadeloupe  
Guatemala  
Guyana  
Haiti  
Honduras  
Jamaica  
Martinique  
Mexico  
Montserrat  
Netherlands Antilles  
Nicaragua  
Panama  
Paraguay  
Peru  
St. Kitts & Nevis  
St. Lucia  
St. Pierre & Miquelon  
St. Vincent  
Suriname  
Trinidad

Turks & Caicos  
Venezuela